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DISCIPLINARY SEGREGATION:  
HOW THE PUNITIVE SOLITARY CONFINEMENT 
POLICY IN FEDERAL PRISONS VIOLATES THE 
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH 
AMENDMENT IN SPITE OF SANDIN V. CONNER 
In 1995, the Supreme Court decided Sandin v. Connor, which held 
inmates did not have a protected liberty interest requiring due process 
before being placed in solitary confinement.  With the increasing 
problems in the criminal justice systems nationwide, or perhaps a renewed 
interest in those problems, the public has turned its attention to the plight 
of the incarcerated.  This Comment seeks to flush out the reasoning the 
Court provided in Sandin and understand the impacts of the “atypical 
and significant hardship” on subsequent prisoner litigation, chiefly 
involving solitary confinement.  Following the legal analysis of cases, this 
Comment will view the process of how prisoners end up in solitary 
confinement in federal prisons and then look to the psychological world, 
which has provided a number of studies on the effect solitary confinement 
has on prisoners.  When creating law, it should be informed first and 
foremost by reason; it is understandable how the Court made its decision 
in Sandin, absent evidence that there is a very real distinction between the 
effect of being in general population and the effect of being in solitary 
confinement.  However, today, almost twenty years after Sandin, we know 
there is a substantial difference between the effects each type of 
incarceration has on inmates, which is not adequately handled by 
administrative proceedings that lack due process.  The effect solitary 
confinement has on individuals is detrimental to the mental and social 
health of inmates and is experienced by few within the prison context, and 
knowing this, it is appropriate that solitary confinement be regarded as an 
“atypical and significant hardship” within the federal prison context, thus 
invoking the due process guarantees of the Fifth Amendment. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The term “solitary confinement” is broad within the federal prison 
context; it can mean an inmate has been placed on either 
“administrative detention status,” which is non-punitive,1 or 
 
1.  FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NO. 5270.10, SPECIAL HOUSING 
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“disciplinary segregation status,”2 which is punitive solitary confinement 
assigned by a Disciplinary Hearing Officer.3  This Comment is 
concerned with the latter.  Government-sanctioned punishment requires 
due process of law,4 and this Comment contends that the Federal 
Bureau of Prison’s current policy for administering disciplinary 
segregation does not meet the requisite amount of due process for 
imposing such a severe punishment as solitary confinement. 
Most recently the Supreme Court dealt with the issue of due process 
and solitary confinement in Sandin v. Conner.5  In that case, the 
Supreme Court found that the Hawaiian prison policy for placing 
inmates in solitary confinement did not impose an “atypical and 
significant hardship”6 on inmates and thus did not invoke due process 
protections.7  However, that standard both ignores Supreme Court 
precedent on due process protections for inmates8 and improperly finds 
solitary confinement is not an atypical and significant hardship.9  
Additionally, the use of solitary confinement also works against penal 
and administrative prison goals, which are often cited in the need for 
limited due process in a prison context.10  Flowing from both a proper 
understanding that solitary confinement is demonstrably “atypical” and 
“significant” and a practical understanding that using solitary 
confinement acts counter to penal administrative goals, the current 
Federal Bureau of Prisons policy for placing inmates in punitive solitary 
confinement clearly violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment. 
 
UNITS 2–3 (2011) (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 541.22 (2011)), 
http://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5270_010.pdf [perma.cc/P5SG-3943]. 
2.  This is the Federal Bureau of Prison’s term for punitive solitary confinement; a 
number of states have varying names, so I will use “disciplinary confinement” throughout this 
Comment and make distinctions in practice when necessary for analysis.  FED. BUREAU OF 
PRISONS, supra note 1, at 3 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 541.22(b) (2011)). 
3.  FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, supra note 1, at 3 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 541.22(b) (2011)). 
4.  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
5.  515 U.S. 472 (1995). 
6.  Id. at 484. 
7.  Id. at 486. 
8.  See infra Part II. 
9.  See infra Part VI. 
10.  See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 490 (1972); see also infra Part V. 
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II. THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSES AND INMATE-LITIGANTS PRE-
SANDIN V. CONNER 
Prior to the Court’s decision in Sandin v. Conner,11 the Supreme 
Court developed precedent implicating due process protections when 
prison officials altered an inmate’s confinement conditions.12  Morrissey 
v. Brewer13 in 1972 and Wolff v. McDonnell14 in 1974 are notable cases in 
this precedent.  In both cases, the Court found the need for basic due 
process protection: The former laid out the bevy of basic protections—
all of which were required in a parole revocation context—and the latter 
set the minimal requirements in the incarceration context.15  The only 
reading of these cases indicates expansive due process guarantees under 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments—guarantees that would become 
severely restricted later. 
A. Morrissey v. Brewer at the Supreme Court 
In Morrissey, the Supreme Court addressed whether the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment16 applied to parolees 
facing revocation, thus affording them an opportunity to challenge the 
revocation.17  Two parolees claimed they had their parole revoked 
without an opportunity for a hearing when parole was revoked on their 
 
11.  515 U.S. 472. 
12.  See infra Parts II.A, II.B, II.C. 
13.  408 U.S. 471; see also infra Part II.A. 
14.  418 U.S. 539 (1974); see also infra Part II.C. 
15.  Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481, 489 (establishing that a number of due process 
protections were guaranteed despite being limited by the nature of the post-conviction 
context); Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563–67 (explicitly leaving the door open for more due process 
protections in the prison context). 
16.  The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are identical in 
application to the federal government and states respectively.  See, e.g., Malinski v. New 
York, 324 U.S. 401, 415 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“To suppose that ‘due process of 
law’ meant one thing in the Fifth Amendment and another in the Fourteenth is too frivolous 
to require elaborate rejection.”). 
17.  Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 472.  Though this case concerns parole, not disciplinary 
confinement, they both share the important quality of being “an established variation on 
imprisonment of convicted criminals.”  Id. at 477; see also FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NO. 5270.09, INMATE DISCIPLINE PROGRAM, 12, 14 (2011), 
http://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5270_009.pdf [perma.cc/VS69-5WZT] (listing both 
rescission of parole and disciplinary segregation as possible sanctions for inmates).  The 
available sanctions are also listed in 28 C.F.R. § 541.3(b) tbl.1 (2015). 
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parole officers’ recommendations.18  The Supreme Court agreed with 
the parolees’ argument that they had been denied due process.19 
In Morrissey, prior to arriving at the Supreme Court, the court of 
appeals agreed with the State’s contention that prison officials require 
broad discretion when making revocation determinations and “that 
courts should retain their traditional reluctance to interfere with 
disciplinary matters” under prison authorities’ control.20  However, the 
Supreme Court did not agree that parole revocation did not implicate 
due process.21 
Due process is implicated whenever the state acts to cause an 
individual “grievous loss.”22  Revocation implicated loss of liberty, even 
though the parolee did not enjoy the “absolute liberty” granted free 
citizens.23  Furthermore, society has an interest in treating parolees with 
basic fairness.24  The Court then decided, upon determining that due 
process applies, what process is due.25  There is no doubt that a “simple 
factual hearing will not interfere with the exercise of discretion” of the 
state.26 
The Court then provided a rough structure of what due process 
required.  The minimum due process requirements are as follows: 
 
18.  Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 472–73.  The State claimed, for the first time before the 
Supreme Court, that it had granted hearings to both petitioners; thus, the Court treated the 
record from the courts below as fact and denied any claim hearings were granted to 
petitioners.  Id. at 475–77. 
19.  See id. at 490. 
20.  Id. at 475; see also Morrissey v. Brewer, 443 F.2d 942, 948, 951 (8th Cir. 1971). 
21.  See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. 
22.  Id. at 481 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).  The Court determined the nature of the loss by 
comparing the liberty interests of a parolee with the liberty interests of a never-convicted 
person.  Id. at 482.  As a side note, it does not affect the analysis whether that liberty is 
categorized as a privilege or a right. 
23.  Id. at 480–82. 
24.  Id. at 484 (“[F]air treatment in parole revocations will enhance the chance of 
rehabilitation by avoiding reactions to arbitrariness.”). 
25.  Id. at 484.  Due process is not a rigid standard, but a flexible standard based in 
context—“it is a recognition that not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for 
the same kinds of [protections].”  Id. at 481. 
26.  Id. at 483.  The Court notes the parole board does not need to concern itself with 
providing this process while maintaining a prison.  See id. 486.  However, a process that 
requires witnesses be present at the risk of prisoner and staff safety is not contemplated in 
Part VIII—a process that does not allow safety to become a rubber stamp is.  See infra Part 
VIII. 
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(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) 
disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity 
to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary 
evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse 
witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause 
for not allowing confrontation); (e) a “neutral and detached” 
hearing body[,] . . . which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; 
and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence 
relied on and reasons for revoking parole.27 
This is not as demanding as the full process given throughout criminal 
trials; conditioned liberty requires only a narrow, informal review 
without the constraints of the rules of evidence.28  The Court provided a 
flexible set of process requirements, none too burdensome for any 
state.29  These requirements are simple, simply applied, and should serve 
as the framework for reviewing, with consequences, the conduct of a 
person with limited liberty. 
B. Gagnon v. Scarpelli in 1973 
The following year, the Supreme Court heard Gagnon v. Scarpelli.30  
Scarpelli was convicted of armed robbery in Wisconsin and placed on a 
suspended sentence and probation.31  While lawfully residing in Illinois 
under the terms of his probation, Scarpelli was caught burglarizing a 
home; he confessed to the burglary and later claimed the confession was 
false and given under duress.32  His probation was revoked without a 
hearing for cavorting with known criminals and for committing the 
burglary, and Scarpelli was sent to Green Bay Prison to begin serving 
his previously suspended, fifteen-year sentence.33 
 
27.  Id. at 489.  The Court would later add the right to counsel—or documentation of 
refusal of right to counsel—to parolees’ rights at parole revocation hearings.  Gagnon v. 
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790–91 (1973).  As the Court was presented with new questions 
surrounding the due process protections for persons with limited or conditioned liberty 
interests, the Court took a strong stance on what protections were owed. 
28.  Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489. 
29.  Id. at 490. 
30.  411 U.S. 778. 
31.  Id. at 779. 
32.  Id. at 779–80. 
33.  Id. at 780 (noting that at no point was Scarpelli afforded a hearing during his 
incarceration). 
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Three years into his sentence, Scarpelli filed a writ of habeas 
corpus.34  However, he was released on parole before any action had 
been made on his writ.35  Still, the district court found that the custody of 
a parolee conferred jurisdiction and that, due to collateral 
consequences, the issue was not moot.36  There, the district court found 
that revocation without a hearing and without counsel amounted to a 
violation of due process—this was affirmed by the court of appeals.37 
The Court began by focusing on the holding of Morrissey v. Brewer: 
while not part of the criminal prosecution, the loss of liberty at stake 
during a parole revocation38 hearing is sufficient enough to warrant two 
distinct hearings.39  Here, the Court reasserted the importance of the 
“minimum requirements of due process” granted during a parole 
revocation hearing.40  These are the assurances against “ill-considered 
revocation,”41 and the Court also added that the need for an indigent 
probationer’s or parolee’s representation by counsel at these hearings 
should be determined on a case-by-case basis.42 
The Court held that, because of the liberty interest, Scarpelli was 
owed a revocation hearing and that, due to his claim of duress, he 
should also be owed counsel for the determination of his role in the 
commission of the burglary.43  Here, the Court espoused the importance 
 
34.  Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Scarpelli v. Gagnon, 317 F. Supp. 72, 74 (E.D. 
Wis. 1970) (No. 68-C-387). 
35.  Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 780. 
36.  Scarpelli, 317 F. Supp. at 74. 
37.  Id. at 74–78, aff’d sub nom. Gunsolus v. Gagnon, 454 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1971). 
38.  Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782 (the distinction between a parole revocation and probation 
revocation is immaterial; neither is part of the criminal prosecution and both result in loss of 
liberty). 
39.  Id. at 781–82 (describing two hearings: the first hearing is to establish probable 
cause, and the second hearing—which is more comprehensive—is to determine the final 
revocation decision). 
40.  Id. at 786 (quoting Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972)). 
41.  Id. at 786. 
42.  Id. at 789–90.  This is, again, distinct from a criminal prosecution, and thus, the per 
se rule demanding indigent representation by counsel established in Gideon v. Wainwright, 
372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963), is not appropriate; however, representation by counsel will be rare—
“participation of counsel will probably be both undesirable and constitutionally unnecessary 
in most revocation hearings, there will remain certain cases in which fundamental fairness—
the touchstone of due process—will require that the State provide at its expense counsel for 
indigent probationers or parolees.”  Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 790. 
43.  Gagnon, 411 U.S at 791. 
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of maintaining fundamental—though not formal—protections when the 
loss of liberty was at stake.44 
C. Wolff v. McDonnell at the Supreme Court 
A year after Scarpelli, the Court took up Wolff v. McDonnell.45  This 
case raised the issue of what due process inmates should expect during 
disciplinary proceedings that affect the term of confinement.46  In the 
Nebraska penal system, an inmate’s “flagrant or serious misconduct” is 
punishable through two mechanisms: withholding good-time credits the 
inmate previously earned or confinement of the inmate in a disciplinary 
cell.47  The former “affects the term of confinement,”48 whereas the 
latter “involves alteration of the conditions of confinement.”49 
The Court explicitly held that inmates are protected by the 
Constitution and the Due Process Clause, even if the rights granted 
therein are diminished by the institutional environment of a prison.50  
Thus, determining what due process is required during disciplinary 
hearings involves balancing the “institutional needs and objectives”51 
against the constitutional rights of the inmate.52  Because disciplinary 
hearings may result in alteration of the term of confinement, how that 
determination is made becomes “critical,” which is to say minimal 
procedural safeguards must be in place.53 
In the Nebraska scheme the case arose under, the Adjustment 
Committee acted as fact finder in disciplinary proceedings and 
determined which sanctions were appropriate.54  A charged inmate 
 
44.  See id. 
45.  418 U.S. 539 (1974). 
46.  Id. at 544–47.  Respondent, along with other inmates, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim 
against the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex for denial of due process under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 542. 
47.  NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-185(2) (1971).  It is realized that the Court used a 1972 
supplement to the 1971 version of the Nebraska Revised Statutes; however, the differences 
between the 1971 and 1972 versions are minor and irrelevant here.  Wolff, 418 U.S. 545 n.5. 
48.  Wolff, 418 U.S. at 547. 
49.  Id. 
50.  Id. at 555–56 (“[A] prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional protections 
when he is imprisoned for a crime.”). 
51.  Id. at 556.  One of the goals noted by the Court is the modification of the inmate’s 
behavior and values when sanctioning him through a disciplinary proceeding.  Id. at 562–63. 
52.  Id. at 556. 
53.  Id. at 558. 
54.  Id. at 549–52 (citing NEB. PENAL & CORR. COMPLEX PENITENTIARY UNIT, 
GENERAL POLICY AND PROCEDURE: INMATE CONTROL MISCONDUCT AND THE 
 
 2015] DISCIPLINARY SEGREGATION 485 
could question the charging officer before the committee but had no 
right to call witnesses or present any documentary support in defense of 
the charge.55  However, under the scheme, inmates had no notice of the 
proceedings,56 so the Court held that the officials must give an inmate 
sufficient time “to marshal the facts and prepare a defense.”57  
Additionally, the Court held an inmate has the right to call witnesses in 
his defense and to present documentary evidence at the hearing.58  
Obviously, the Court views due process as granting more than a 
superficial right to a defense—even in the context of inmates with 
limited liberty interests, the Due Process Clause ensures fairness. 
The Court held that current practices in penal systems nationwide 
implicated no need for the right to confront one’s accuser or the right to 
appointed counsel in disciplinary proceedings—due process is a context 
dependent determination.59  Still, the Court made note that this opinion 
was not “graven in stone” and that there remains a possibility of 
extending all of the Morrissey-Scarpelli protections to inmates facing the 
loss of good-time credits.60 
It is worth noting Justice Marshall’s dissent in this case for one 
particular reason: the protections the majority claims inmates have in 
these proceedings do not protect the inmate.  Without the ability to 
confront his accuser or call witnesses, even an innocent inmate “will 
invariably be the loser.”61  Unable to call impartial witnesses, the inmate 
 
ADJUSTMENT COMMITTEE (1971)) (listing the members of the “Adjustment Committee” as 
“the Associate Warden Custody, the Correctional Industries Superintendent, and the 
Reception Center Director,” who are likely a neutral and detached hearing body in most 
cases). 
55.  See id. at 552–53 (quoting McDonnell v. Wolff, 342 F. 616, 625–26 (1972)).  The 
Court notes that retaliation by prisoners is a concern in administrating disciplinary 
proceedings.  Id. at 562. 
56.  Id. at 564. 
57.  Id. 
58.  Id. at 566.  However, prison officials may still deny witnesses if allowing the witness 
would be “unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals.”  Id. 
59.  Id. at 568–69. 
60.  Id. at 571–72. 
61.  Id. at 581–82 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).  Even in the prison 
context, “[f]ew rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in 
his own defense.”  Id. at 583 (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973)).  
Justice Marshall also makes a compelling point about the concern over safety and the right to 
confront one’s accuser: Most charges are brought by prison officials, not other inmates, and 
when they are brought by inmates, the accuser is likely already known, e.g., the assault victim.  
See id. at 586–87, 589 (“[A] substantial majority of the States do permit confrontation and 
cross-examination in prison disciplinary proceedings, and their experience simply does not 
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is unlikely to surmount the issue of credibility when charged with 
serious misconduct by a prison official.62  Worse than that is the 
abridgement of the right itself for the sake of administration when “the 
Due Process Clause ‘recognizes higher values than speed and 
efficiency.’”63  The Court should allow only the most necessary and 
minimal limitations to due process: Prisons should no longer limit 
defense witnesses as a matter of course, lest the judiciary step in to 
protect that fundamental constitutional right, and when it is necessary to 
restrict confrontation, the Adjustment Committee should probe the 
credibility of the accuser in camera for itself.64  In short, Justice 
Marshall’s dissent outlines some very serious problems with the 
majority’s application of minimal due process while providing potential 
corrections for those problems. 
D. Due Process in This Era 
 Following the holdings of these cases, there is one apparent theme: a 
present limitation on liberty does not entail the loss of due process rights 
for further restrictions on liberty.  While tailored to match the situation 
that these plaintiffs faced—e.g., loss of probation-based liberty to 
extremely limited liberty during incarceration—each plaintiff was due 
some process to protect their liberty interests.  Each type of liberty lost 
deserved some type of procedural protections because each plaintiff 
actually had liberty worth protecting. 
 Though the Court did not demand the litany of procedural due 
process rights granted a defendant at trial, it sought to ensure that no 
liberty was stripped away without adequate procedural safeguards.  
However, as we examine the state of disciplinary segregation in federal 
prisons—a loss of liberty compared with prisoners living in general 
populations—in the following part, the lack of procedural safeguards 
offered inmates today becomes apparent. 
III. THE FEDERAL PROCESS OF DISCIPLINARY SEGREGATION  
The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) currently has a policy for 
assigning problematic inmates to solitary confinement, which is 
 
bear out the speculative fears of Nebraska authorities.”). 
62.  See id. at 583 (citing Clutchette v. Procunier, 497 F.2d 809, 818 (9th Cir. 1974)). 
63.  Id. (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 n.22 (1972)). 
64.  Id. at 584, 590. 
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examined here for its effectiveness at providing due process.65  The 
process for placement in solitary confinement is handled by a number of 
individuals and boards at various steps in the process.66  However, this 
process, while well reviewed concerning adjudicators, gives little control 
to the defendant in ever presenting a viable defense before an 
adjudicator.67  The BOP’s efficacy in actuating this policy has even been 
called into question by the Government Accountability Office (GAO).68  
Ultimately, the BOP’s policy regarding disciplinary segregation leaves 
due process protections unsatisfied. 
A. The Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Disciplinary Segregation Policy 
The BOP has set forth policies regarding the use of solitary 
confinement for disciplinary segregation within its Inmate Discipline 
Program.69  This program was last updated July 8, 2011, despite the 
GAO recommending a new, refined oversight program in May 2013.70  
Following is the current process of determining whether an inmate’s 
conduct should be punished with disciplinary confinement.71 
The Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) ultimately determines 
whether an inmate should be placed in disciplinary segregation, which 
may be up to twelve months for a single offense.72  The discipline 
 
65.  See FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, supra note 17; see also infra Part III.A. 
66.  See FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, supra note 17; see also 28 C.F.R. pt. 541 (2015). 
67.  See FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, supra note 17, at 17–20, 23–36 (citing 28 C.F.R. 
§§ 541.5, .7–.8 (2011)). 
68.  See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-429, BUREAU OF 
PRISONS: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN BUREAU OF PRISONS’ MONITORING AND 
EVALUATION OF IMPACT OF SEGREGATED HOUSING (2013), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/654349.pdf [perma.cc/U7JJ-ZEQA]. 
69.  See generally FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, supra note 17 (citing 28 C.F.R. pt. 541 
(2011)). 
70.  FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, supra note 17, at 1; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFF., supra note 68, at 42.  The GAO also recommended the BOP begin comprehensive 
studies regarding the efficacy of disciplinary segregation in correcting inmates’ behavioral 
problems and in administrating cost-effective prisons.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., 
supra note 68, at 42. 
71.  The current BOP policy is based on the due process requirements set forth in Wolff 
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 68, at 10 
n.7.  However, the liberty interest involved in Wolff is less than the liberty interest involved in 
disciplinary segregation.  See infra Part VI. 
72.  See FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, supra note 17, at 14.  If an inmate has committed 
multiple offenses from “different acts,” then the default is to run those disciplinary 
segregation sentences consecutively, not concurrently; twelve months is not the upper bound 
of how much time an inmate may spend in solitary confinement for disciplinary purposes.  Id.  
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process begins when a staff member witnesses, or reasonably believes, 
an inmate was involved in a prohibited act and goes on to draft a 
detailed factual incident report.73  This report is offered to the inmate 
charged with the prohibited act, usually within twenty-four hours, so 
that the inmate may prepare a defense.74  A supervisory employee—who 
was not “the employee reporting the incident or otherwise . . . involved 
in the incident”—is appointed Investigating Officer (IO) by the Warden 
to conduct an investigation, which should be completed within twenty-
four hours of appointment.75  The IO will inform the inmate of the 
charges against him, as well as his right to remain silent.76  Then, the 
inmate may request witnesses be interviewed and evidence preserved.77 
The first stop for potential imposition of disciplinary segregation for 
an inmate is the initial review by the Unit Discipline Committee (UDC), 
which is generally composed of at least two staff members not 
“significantly involved in the incident”;78 however, it is worth noting that 
the UDC may be composed of only one staff member.79  The members 
qualified to sit on the UDC must have completed a self-study program.80  
Inmates under review may appear before the UDC during review “at 
the UDC’s discretion.”81  At his appearance, the inmate may provide 
only documentary evidence in support of his innocence, and the UDC’s 
decision must be made “based on at least some facts.”82  If the UDC 
determines the inmate did commit the prohibited act, and it believes 
 
These lengthy disciplinary segregation sentences are discussed in infra Part VI.B.  It is worth 
noting that such offenses as “[i]nsolence towards a staff member,” “[f]ailing to stand count,” 
altering or damaging another inmate’s or government property “having a value of $100.00 or 
less,” or “[b]eing unsanitary or untidy” may earn an inmate up to three months in disciplinary 
segregation.  FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, supra note 17, at 50–52 tbl.1 (quoting 28 C.F.R. 
§ 541.3(a) tbl.1 (2011)). 
73.  FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, supra note 17, at 17 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 541.5(a) (2011)). 
74.  Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 541.5(a) (2011)). 
75.  Id. at 18.  The inmate does not receive a copy of the IO’s report.  Id. at 20. 
76.  Id. at 18 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 541.5(b)(1) (2011)). 
77.  Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 541.5(b)(2) (2011)). 
78.  Id. at 23 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 541.7 (2011)). 
79.  Id. 
80.  Id. 
81.  Id. at 24 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 541.7(d) (2011)). 
82.  Id. (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 541.7(e) (2011)).  The inference to be drawn is that the 
UDC may not find guilt based only on the inmate’s remaining silent.  See id. at 18 (citing 28 
C.F.R. § 541.5(b)(1)(B) (2011)).  Given that the incident report is launched by a staff 
member, there is already some evidence against the inmate; no right to call witnesses may 
prove detrimental to the inmate’s defense where documented evidence is lacking. 
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disciplinary segregation is appropriate, the UDC must refer the incident 
to the DHO.83 
Along with its recommendation for disciplinary segregation, the 
UDC submits copies of all relevant documents and reasons for referral 
to the DHO.84  The UDC also gives a copy of its decision to refer to the 
inmate and instructs him of his rights before the DHO.85  The inmate 
may appeal the UDC’s referral.86   
The DHO is an impartial decision maker, who is unconnected to the 
incident in question and has received specialized training and 
certification.87  The inmate is given notice of the charges against him at 
least twenty-four hours in advance.88 
An inmate may request or may upon need—e.g., illiteracy—have a 
staff member appointed to assist and represent him in the DHO hearing 
process.89  This representative aids the inmate in understanding the 
charges against him and the possible consequences.90  The 
representative will also help the inmate “speak[] with and schedule[] 
witnesses, obtain[] written statements, and otherwise help[] [the inmate] 
prepare evidence for presentation.”91  The inmate is allowed to appear 
before the DHO during the hearing.92 
During the hearing, the inmate is granted certain procedural 
safeguards; however, the DHO hearing may use “written statements of 
witnesses not readily available,” which may be “liberally used in place of 
in-person witnesses.”93  This raises a serious concern over the actual 
function of witnesses at the DHO hearing—for example, “the DHO 
need not call witnesses adverse to you if their testimony is adequately 
summarized in the incident report or other investigation materials,” 
which means there is no right to confront an accuser.94  Further concern 
 
83.  Id. at 24–25 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 541.7(f)–(g) (2011)). 
84.  Id. at 25. 
85.  Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 541.7(g) (2011)). 
86.  Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 541.7(g) (2011)). 
87.  Id. at 27 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 541.8(b) (2011)). 
88.  Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 541.8(c) (2011)). 
89.  Id. at 27–28 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 541.8(d)(1) (2011)). 
90.  Id. at 28 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 541.8(d)(2) (2011)). 
91.  Id. (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 541.8(d)(2) (2011)). 
92.  Id. at 28–29 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 541.8(e) (2011)). 
93.  Id. at 29 (emphasis added). 
94.  Id. at 30 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 541.8(f)(2) (2011)); see also Patterson v. Superior 
Court of Cal., 420 U.S. 1301 (1975). 
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arises from the DHO’s complete, discretionary control over what 
questions are asked of the witnesses that do appear—the inmate has no 
right to question the accuser, and his right to confront an accuser may be 
limited to receiving the witness’s prepared written statement.95  
Furthermore, the DHO does not have to call any witnesses requested by 
the inmate if he does not believe the testimony will be helpful.96  The 
DHO is also allowed to rely on information from a confidential 
informant he “finds reliable”; the informant will not be revealed to the 
inmate facing punishment, and what portions of his testimony may be 
made available to the inmate are done so at the DHO’s discretion.97  
Compounding this problem is that, again, the DHO need only make a 
determination of guilt on “some facts,” as was the case before the 
UDC.98 
Upon determining an inmate’s guilt, the DHO will submit a written 
report to the charged inmate, which will include the following: whether 
the inmate was advised of his rights, what evidence the DHO relied on, 
what the DHO decided, what sanction the DHO imposed, and what 
reasons underlie that sanction.99  The inmate has the opportunity to 
appeal to the Regional Director at the Bureau of Prisons.100  Though 
prisoners do not enjoy the panoply of due process rights owed free 
citizens, the current process seems to lack or severely condition some 
fundamental rights of due process.101 
B. The Government Accountability Office’s Evaluation of the Federal 
Bureau of Prison’s Policy in Practice 
Due to the growing concerns over America’s prison systems, U.S. 
Senator Richard Durbin, joined by two other U.S. congressmen, 
requested the GAO investigate the BOP’s use of segregated housing.102  
 
95.  FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, supra note 17, at 30–32 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 541.8(f) 
(2011)). 
96.  Id. at 31 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 541.8(f)(2)–(3) (2011)). 
97.  Id. at 30 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 541.8(f)(6) (2011)).  “Uncorroborated confidential 
information from a single informant is insufficient as the sole basis for a finding, unless the 
circumstances of the incident and the knowledge possessed by the informant are convincing 
enough to show that the information must be reliable.”  Id. at 32. 
98.  Id. at 29–30 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 541.8(f) (2011)). 
99.  Id. at 34 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 541.8(h) (2011)). 
100.  Id. at 35 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 541.8(i) (2011)). 
101.  E.g., the right to confront one’s accuser, question him, and call witnesses in one’s 
defense.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
102.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 68, at 1–2. 
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The GAO completed its report in May 2013.103  The report raised 
concerns over the effectiveness of current BOP segregated housing 
policy in achieving penal goals.104 
The GAO’s study covers the BOP’s care and custody of over 200,000 
federal inmates.105  At interest here are the inmates placed in 
disciplinary segregation and, more particularly, those in single-person 
cells for disciplinary confinement placed at the Florence Administrative 
Maximum Facility (ADX).106  The BOP claims that it does not hold 
anyone in solitary confinement because guards regularly visit with 
inmates, inmates may interact during recreation times, and inmates in 
adjoining cells may communicate;107 however, these inmates may be 
confined to these restrictive conditions twenty-three hours a day for 
years at a time.108 
The BOP has a centralized Program Review Division (PRD), which 
completes reviews of the Special Housing Units (SHU) and Special 
Management Units (SMU)—less restrictive disciplinary segregation 
schemes109—every three years based on specific monitoring policies.110  
However, there are no such specific monitoring requirements for ADX 
confinement, and it is not scrutinized to the same degree when 
reviewed.111  The BOP says this policy is in place, in part, because all 
ADX referrals and placements are monitored by BOP headquarters and 
placements are reviewed every sixty to ninety days.112  The GAO raised 
issue with the lack of actual oversight BOP headquarters has in 
 
103.  Id. at 1. 
104.  See id. at 41–42.  This report only concerns the inmates of the 119 BOP-operated 
facilities, so the study does not cover issues arising from privately managed prisons.  Id. at 1 
n.1. 
105.  Id. at 1.  The federal prison population has grown by 400% since the 1980s, and 
with that has come the increased use of “highly restrictive conditions.”  Id. 
106.  See id. at 9 fig.2. 
107.  Id. at 12. 
108.  Id. at 12 & n.11, 22. 
109.  See id. at 7 fig.1. 
110.  Id. at 17. 
111.  Id. at 22–23 (“BOP HQ lacks oversight over the extent to which ADX staff are in 
compliance with many ADX-specific requirements related to conditions of confinement and 
procedural protections to the same degree that it has for SHUs and SMUs.  According to 
PRD officials, PRD does not assess the extent to which ADX provides conditions of 
confinement or procedural protections as required under ADX policy and program 
statements because it is not required to do so.  As a result, PRD cannot report to BOP 
management on the extent of compliance with these ADX-specific requirements.”). 
112.  Id. at 22. 
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determining whether ADX policies are being followed and 
recommended tighter monitoring be put in place to ensure ADX-
specific policies were followed.113  The GAO emphasized the importance 
of monitoring implementation and execution of programming to ensure 
effective administration and achievement of governmental goals.114 
The GAO also found the BOP’s lack of documentation 
concerning.115  Specifically, in its report the GAO stressed the lack of 
documentation relating to procedural protections and conditions of 
confinement.116  Upon reviewing fifty-one case files of inmates placed in 
disciplinary segregation, only forty-two of them provided the underlying 
reason for disciplinary segregation.117  The BOP claimed that a new 
software program—SHU application118—would help the documentation 
issues in its prisons; however, the BOP was unable to articulate its goals 
and objectives in using the new software or how the software would 
address the documentation problems.119  Overall, the GAO found the 
BOP’s ADX monitoring lacking and recommended new requirements 
 
113.  See id. at 22, 24. 
114.  See id. at 24 (“The [Standards for Internal Controls in the Federal Government] 
state, among other things, that monitoring activities are an integral part of an entity’s 
planning, implementing, reviewing, and accountability for stewardship of government 
resources and achieving effective results.  Specific requirements for PRD to monitor ADX-
specific policies to the same degree that these requirements exist for SHUs and SMUs could 
help provide BOP HQ additional assurance that ADX officials are following BOP policies to 
hold inmates in a humane manner, in its highest security, most restrictive facility.”); see also 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-704G, STANDARDS FOR INTERNAL CONTROL 
IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (2014), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665712.pdf 
[perma.cc/EJ7Y-5N39].  The Acting Assistant Director of PRD agreed such monitoring 
mechanisms should be implemented.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 68, at 
24. 
115.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 68, at 25 (“[GAO] reviewed 
45 PRD monitoring reports from 20 prisons that assessed compliance at [lower-level 
disciplinary segregation units].  PRD identified deficiencies in 38 of these reports, including 
documentation concerns in 30 reports.”). 
116.  Id. at 25.  There was not clear documentation that inmates in disciplinary 
segregation were given all their meals or their daily hour for exercise—“documentation at 
these prisons did not clearly indicate that these standards were always observed.”  Id. 
117.  Id. at 27. 
118.  Id. at 28.  SHU application is a new software program for SHUs and SMUs that 
“could improve the documentation of the conditions of confinement in SHUs and SMUs, 
but . . . may not address all the deficiencies . . . identified.”  Id. 
119.  Id. at 28–29 (describing how the BOP did not provide evidence because the 
software program was too new to provide data for evaluation of its impact on the lack of 
documentation in BOP prisons). 
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be developed to ensure inmates receive their procedural protections and 
conditions of confinement.120 
C. Solitary Confinement Today 
 It is apparent from the BOP’s punitive solitary confinement process 
alone that placing an inmate in solitary confinement is a one-sided 
endeavor.  These inmates are not given any meaningful opportunity to 
present a viable defense—an essential aspect of due process—which 
goes against the precedent established by the Supreme Court in the line 
of cases flowing from Morrissey v. Brewer.121  This is a process that the 
GAO calls into question for effectiveness.  However, the process the 
BOP employs does not arise from nothing. 
 The following part addresses Sandin v. Conner, a Supreme Court 
case addressing the rights retained by inmates facing solitary 
confinement.122  The Court issued a short standard for reviewing those 
rights,123 but the standard is not simple, particularly in light of modern 
psychology and statistics.124 
IV. SANDIN V. CONNER: EFFECTS ON THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE FOR 
INMATE-LITIGANTS CONCERNING SOLITARY CONFINEMENT 
In 1995, the Supreme Court decided the last case concerning 
punitive solitary confinement in Sandin v. Conner.125  This case offered 
the standard “atypical and significant hardship” that must be found in 
change-of-confinement situations to warrant due process protections.126  
This has led to few cases elaborating on that standard from lower courts, 
all of which will be described and analyzed in the following part.127  The 
questions are whether the Court gave sufficient guidance and whether 
its decision comports with what the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments require under Wolff v. McDonnell.128 
 
120.  See id. at 42. 
121.  408 U.S. 471 (1972); see also supra Part II. 
122.  515 U.S. 472 (1995). 
123.  See id. at 483–84. 
124.  See infra Part IV. 
125.  515 U.S. 472. 
126.  Id. at 483–84, 486. 
127.  See infra Part IV.A, IV.B. 
128.  418 U.S. 539 (1974). 
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A. Sandin v. Conner at the Supreme Court 
DeMont Conner was an inmate at a Hawaii maximum-security 
prison.129  When a prison guard attempted a strip search and inspection 
of Conner’s rectum, he pulled away from the guard and used 
profanity.130  He was charged with “high misconduct” for pulling away 
from the guard and “low moderate misconduct” for cursing at the 
guard.131  Conner subsequently appeared before the Adjustment 
Committee, which rejected his request to call witnesses for his 
defense.132  The committee found him guilty of those prohibited 
conducts and “sentenced him to 30 days’ disciplinary segregation.”133  
Nine months later, one of the deputy administrators found the 
misconduct charges unsupported and expunged Conner’s record.134 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held in favor of Conner’s claim 
that the limited process granted him by the Adjustment Committee 
violated the Due Process Clause under Wolff v. McDonnell.135  
However, the Supreme Court did not view the precedent as favorable to 
Conner’s case, holding that—despite the later factual determination that 
Conner was not guilty of the prohibited conduct for want of evidence—
all due process requirements had been fulfilled.136  The Court focused on 
what rights flow from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment itself rather than whether the State had created a liberty 
interest in remaining free from disciplinary segregation.137 
The focal point of the majority’s argument is that the case line 
following Wolff created two issues: due process analysis now focuses on 
state-created liberty interests and disincentivizes states from codifying 
prison regulations, and that that approach “has led to the involvement 
of federal courts in the day-to-day management of prisons.”138  The 
Court stated that the focus on the language of a given statute or 
regulation, rather than a focus on “the nature of the deprivation,” has 
 
129.  Sandin, 515 U.S. at 474–75. 
130.  Id. at 475. 
131.  Id. 
132.  Id. 
133.  Id. 
134.  Id. at 476. 
135.  Conner v. Sakai, 15 F.3d 1463, 1467–68 (9th Cir. 1993), rev’d sub nom. Sandin v. 
Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). 
136.  Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486–487. 
137.  Id. 
138.  Id. at 482. 
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led inmates to litigate over any and all interests they can find in prison 
regulations, even when successful litigation bears “little . . . benefit to 
anyone.”139  The Court stated that Conner’s punishment was not the 
type of “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to 
the ordinary incidents of prison life.”140  Obviously, abuse of the court 
system is a serious concern, but these arguments seem to distract from 
the case at hand, which involved a serious liberty interest: the movement 
to severely confined disciplinary segregation.  While the reasoning in 
Sandin explicitly supports the holding in Wolff—to analyze based on the 
nature of the deprivation of the liberty141—its application of that analysis 
is flawed. 
B. Wilkinson v. Austin at the Supreme Court 
Ten years after Sandin, the Supreme Court addressed what 
procedure is required under the Fourteenth Amendment when 
assigning an inmate to a “Supermax” prison facility.142  The Ohio 
Supermax facility at issue in this case—the Ohio State Penitentiary 
(OSP)—was designed to be highly restrictive, comprised of 504 single-
inmate cells designed to keep the most violent and dangerous offenders 
separated from the general prison population.143 
The cells at the OSP were extremely solitary in design—“[i]t is fair 
to say OSP inmates are deprived . . . of almost all human contact.”144  
Inmates were placed in these cells for an indefinite period of time, 
limited only by the length of their sentence.145  Inmates are placed at 
 
139.  Id. 481–82. 
140.  Id. at 484. 
141.  Id. at 482–83. 
142.  Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 213 (2005).  “Supermax facilities are maximum-
security prisons with highly restrictive conditions, designed to segregate the most dangerous 
prisoners from the general prison population.”  Id.  The Ohio Supermax facility is the most 
restrictive incarceration available in the state, more restrictive than any Ohio administrative 
control units—“a highly restrictive form of solitary confinement”—or even death row.  Id. at 
214.  “About 30 States now operate Supermax prisons, in addition to the two somewhat 
comparable facilities operated by the Federal Government.”  Id. at 213–14. 
143.  Id. at 214 (the inmates at the Supermax facility could leave their cell for one hour a 
day); see also CORR. INST. INSPECTION COMM., CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION INSPECTION 
COMMITTEE REPORT ON THE INSPECTION AND EVALUATION OF OHIO STATE 
PENITENTIARY 2–3 (2015), 
http://ciic.state.oh.us/docs/Ohio%20State%20Penitentiary%202015.pdf [perma.cc/PGX2-
ENT8]. 
144.  Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 214. 
145.  Id. at 214–15 (“For an inmate serving a life sentence, there is no indication how 
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OSP based on the nature of their crimes or their conduct while in 
prison;146 the process is initiated by a prison official, and then reviewed 
by three groups—any of which may terminate the process.147 
The notable due process issue in this case is the inmate’s complete 
lack of ability to call witnesses in his defense.148  Here, the Court 
reasserted its prior holdings that no due process violation occurs by 
placing inmates in more restrictive custody.149  The Court held that the 
solitary confinement of the inmates at OSP did create a protectable 
liberty interest, which was affected by the “atypical and significant 
hardship”; however, the Court also held the policy in place adequately 
addressed due process concerns.150 
C. Stark Contrast 
 These cases hold a remarkably different tenor toward inmates’ rights 
than the cases arising out of the Morrisey case line.151  Inmates have an 
extremely limited opportunity for due process, and what is available to 
them is one-sided.  However, these holdings are flawed in their 
reasoning because these prison practices are flawed in effectiveness and 
practicality, which is discussed in the following part.152  Flawed, also, is 
the assertion that a punishment must be “atypical and significant” to 
trigger due process protections, yet what is considered “atypical and 
significant” punishment excludes solitary confinement, which is a 
premise examined both statistically and scientifically in a further part.153 
V. SANDIN V. CONNER WRONGLY ASSUMES EFFECTIVE PRISON 
ADMINISTRATION AND PENOLOGICAL INTERESTS 
The Supreme Court held that imposition of solitary confinement 
“effectuates prison management and prisoner rehabilitative goals.”154  
However, this is a presumption not supported by the evidence.155  The 
 
long he may be incarcerated at OSP once assigned there.”). 
146.  Id. at 216. 
147.  Id. at 216–17. 
148.  Id. at 216. 
149.  Id. at 221–22 (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976)). 
150.  Id. at 223, 230. 
151.  See supra Part II. 
152.  See infra Part V. 
153.  See infra Part VI. 
154.  Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995). 
155.  See infra Parts V.A, V.B. 
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use of solitary confinement limits effective prison administration and 
creates a population more inclined to reoffend.156 
A. Solitary Confinement Increases the Need for Prison Administration, 
Spreading Limited Resources More Thinly Than Before 
Prisons are expensive institutions and require incredible amounts of 
administration to function.157  However, the cost of generic prisons pales 
in comparison with the cost of disciplinary segregation units.  The 
GAO’s report estimated the cost of administration for the varying levels 
of security institutions.158  The daily inmate per capita cost at one of the 
BOP high security facilities is $69.41.159  Comparatively, the daily per 
capita of inmates in Special Management Units (SMU)—restrictive 
compared to general-population, disciplinary segregation160—is $119.71, 
despite being in the same facility as general population.161  However, 
even the cost of the SMU is far below the daily per capita for inmates in 
ADX, which totals $216.12 daily.162  The annual cost of ADX was 
roughly $34 million to house 435 inmates in 2012.163  This is not unique 
to the federal system; Alexa Steinbuch found that Supermax facilities in 
Arizona cost “up to three times as much as general prison housing” and 
it costs 45% more to house inmates in solitary confinement than general 
population in Texas.164  Obviously, this calls into question the fiscal 
responsibility underlying the BOP policy of ADX disciplinary 
segregation. 
One of the fundamental goals of prison administration is safety.165  
However, there is little evidence to suggest disciplinary segregation 
furthers that goal166—it may even function contrary to that goal.167  
 
156.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 68, at 39. 
157.  See id. at 30–32. 
158.  Id. at 29–32. 
159.  Id. at 31. 
160.  Id. at 7 fig.1. 
161.  Id. at 31. 
162.  Id. (comparing the daily per capita cost for ADX inmates with the daily per capita 
of $85.74 for non-ADX inmates in the same facility). 
163.  Id. at 32.  Additionally, the current annual cost of SMU is $87 million.  Id.  If all 
these SMU inmates were housed in medium or high security facilities, the cost would annually 
total $42 million and $50 million, respectively.  Id. 
164.  Alexa T. Steinbuch, The Movement Away from Solitary Confinement in the United 
States, 40 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 499, 502 (2014). 
165.  See 18 U.S.C. § 4042(a)(2)–(3) (2012). 
166.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 68, at 33. 
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Despite the continued claim that disciplinary confinement is essential to 
prison administration,168 the BOP has never conducted a study on the 
efficacy of disciplinary segregation in achieving more peaceful prison 
administration.169 
The BOP noted that there had been an overall drop in prison 
assaults and lockdowns, despite an increase in prison population, but 
were unable in any way to link it to the use of disciplinary 
confinement.170  During its study, the GAO reviewed five states’ use of 
disciplinary segregation, all of which instituted new policies directed at 
minimizing the population in disciplinary segregation.171  All five states 
reported no increase in prison violence after moving segregated 
prisoners to less restrictive housing—under the revised standards, 
Mississippi found 80% of its disciplinary segregation inmates were 
inappropriately placed in disciplinary segregation, and Colorado 
reported 37% of its inmates in disciplinary segregation did not require 
that level of security.172  In addition, these two states also reported large 
savings following the closings of segregated housing units.173  Limiting 
the use of solitary confinement—through the use of adequate due 
process—can serve administrative and pragmatic governmental interests 
far better than the current level of use. 
B. Recidivism Rates Are Higher for Prisoners Who Were in Disciplinary 
Segregation 
There is serious concern that extended time in solitary confinement 
causes high rates of recidivism.174  Steinbuch suggests it is the lack of 
human interaction over time “without the opportunity to engage in the 
types of interaction, treatment, and educational experiences” that causes 
such high recidivism rates among these inmates.175  An estimated 40% of 
Supermax inmates from California and Colorado were “directly 
 
167.  Press Release, Dick Durbin, Senator, Durbin Chairs First-Ever Congressional 
Hearing on Solitary Confinement (June 19, 2012), 
http://www.durbin.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/durbin-chairs-first-ever-congressional-
hearing-on-solitary-confinement [perma.cc/JC64-9DEA]. 
168.  See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 562–63 (1974). 
169.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 68, at 33. 
170.  Id. at 33–34. 
171.  Id. at 34 (the states studied were Colorado, Kansas, Maine, Mississippi, and Ohio). 
172.  Id. at 34–35. 
173.  Id. at 34. 
174.  See Steinbuch, supra note 164, at 502. 
175.  Id. 
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released from total isolation.”176  It is no surprise that inmates who have 
spent significant amount of time in solitary confinement conditions 
reoffend at a higher rate than their general population counterparts.177 
C. Failed Goals 
 For the abovementioned reasons, it is apparent that the use of 
solitary confinement abjectly fails the practical goals of its penological 
use.  Solitary confinement complicates prison administration rather than 
simplifying it and heavily increases the cost of prison administration.  
Furthermore, its use limits the chance for success concerning inmates’ 
abilities to keep from reoffending and reintegrate into society. 
 However, as discussed in the following part,178 those are not the only 
reasons the use of solitary confinement fails to meet the Court’s holding 
in Sandin.179 
VI. SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IS AN “ATYPICAL AND SIGNIFICANT 
HARDSHIP” UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE 
The Court has stated that liberty interests must arise from some type 
of or rule or regulation,180 so to challenge the BOP’s policies there must 
be something within the policy granting those rights.  Arguably at issue 
in disciplinary segregation, the BOP created a liberty interest in 
promising no disciplinary sanctions may be imposed in a “capricious” 
manner.181  Discussed below is how the BOP’s current policy qualifies as 
the imposition of an “atypical and significant hardship” lacking 
appropriate due process and how solitary confinement is “a dramatic 
departure from the basic condition[] of [an] indeterminate sentence.”182 
A. Disciplinary Confinement Is Atypical 
The “atypical” requirement set forth in Sandin is not explained.183  
 
176.  Id. (citing End the Overuse of Solitary Confinement, ACLU, 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/stop_solitary_-_two_pager.pdf [perma.
cc/95B8-Z2RU] (last visited Dec. 29, 2015)). 
177.  See id. at 511. 
178.  See infra Part VI. 
179.  515 U.S. 472, 483–84 (1995). 
180.  See id. at 482. 
181.  FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, supra note 17, at 1 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 541.1 (2011)).  
The Inmate Discipline Program is authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 4042(a) (2012). 
182.  Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. 
183.  Id. at 484. 
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There is no metric against which to compare whether a hardship is 
atypical.  So it is best to turn to the plain meaning and understanding of 
the word: “irregular [or] unusual.”184  At issue is whether disciplinary 
segregation in the BOP constitutes an unusual punishment. 
Disciplinary segregation in the BOP does constitute an atypical 
hardship.  The BOP is responsible for 217,000 federal inmates.185  Of 
those inmates, only 12,460 are placed in disciplinary segregation—a 
mere 7% of the federal inmates were segregated.186  Certainly an issue 
affecting only 7% of a population could be viewed as atypical.  
Furthermore, what is really at issue here are those placed in solitary 
disciplinary segregation (ADX),187 which is a total of approximately 435 
inmates in the entire federal prison system.188  The 435 inmates in ADX 
segregation divided into the total federal prison population of 217,000 
equates to roughly 0.2%.189  Even if this number were five times what it 
currently is—then totaling a whole percent—the placement of any 
inmate in solitary disciplinary segregation would certainly constitute an 
atypical hardship.  Thus, any inmate in ADX is suffering an atypical 
hardship within the federal prison system. 
B. Empirical Evidence Has Shown Solitary Confinement Is a Significant 
Hardship to Inmates 
Disciplinary segregation involves solitary confinement for twenty-
three hours a day.190  The significant hardship facing inmates placed in 
disciplinary confinement, chiefly in ADX in federal prisons, is the loss of 
mental well-being.191  At a hearing on the use of solitary confinement in 
the United States, Congress heard evidence from multiple state and 
national studies, which concluded “[f]ifty percent of all prison suicides 
occur in solitary confinement.”192  Loss of liberty is certainly 
 
184.  Atypical, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003). 
185.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 68, at 1. 
186.  Id. at 2. 
187.  Inmates are alone in their cells for about twenty-three hours a day.  Id. 
188.  Id. 
189.  See id. at 1–2. 
190.  Id. at 6. 
191.  Reassessing Solitary Confinement: The Human Rights, Fiscal, and Public Safety 
Consequences: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Constitution, Civil Rights and Human Rights 
of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 3 (2012) [hereinafter Reassessing Solitary 
Confinement] (statement of Sen. Richard J. Durbin, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary); 
Press Release, Dick Durbin, supra note 167. 
192.  Reassessing Solitary Confinement, supra note 191, at 2; see also Press Release, Dick 
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contemplated when sentencing an individual; however, the loss of 
mental acuity is certainly not. 
Solitary confinement may cause a variety of “negative psychological 
reactions” including depression, anxiety, decreased brain function, 
hallucinations, impulse control, and self-mutilation.193  Dr. Craig Haney, 
who testified before Congress on the mental effects of solitary 
confinement,194 has stated that published studies have exclusively found 
ten days in Supermax or solitary confinement conditions precipitates 
negative psychological effects in inmates.195 
Dr. Stuart Grassian studied fifteen inmates in solitary confinement 
at a facility in Massachusetts—their mean age was twenty-eight, and the 
average stay in solitary was two months.196  Among the inmates he 
interviewed, Dr. Grassian found all of the negative psychological issues 
listed above; he found the “specific psychiatric symptoms reported were 
strikingly consistent among the inmates.”197  Dr. Grassian also stated 
that the specific effects of solitary confinement may establish a 
“clinically distinguishable syndrome.”198 
The present concern is whether the BOP’s ADX program causes 
psychological effects.  Unfortunately, the BOP has never studied the 
long-term effects of its ADX program on inmates, which the GAO 
raised issue with in its report.199  The BOP has psychologists meet with 
ADX inmates on a weekly basis and perform an assessment every thirty 
days after placement, and the psychologists have found no negative 
psychological effects among their inmates;200 however, it may be worth 
 
Durbin, Senator, Durbin Statement on Federal Bureau of Prisons Assessment of its Solitary 
Confinement Practices (Feb. 04, 2013), http://www.durbin.senate.gov/newsroom/press-
releases/durbin-statement-on-federal-bureau-of-prisons-assessment-of-its-solitary-confineme
nt-practices [perma.cc/9DSL-UCZF]. 
193.  Steinbuch, supra note 164, at 501 (citing Jeffrey L. Metzner & Jamie Fellner, 
Solitary Confinement and Mental Illness in U.S. Prisons: A Challenge for Medical Ethics, 38 J. 
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 104, 104–05 (2010)); see also Stuart Grassian, 
Psychopathological Effects of Solitary Confinement, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1450 (1983). 
194.  Reassessing Solitary Confinement, supra note 191, at 20–21 (statement of Dr. Craig 
Haney, Professor of Psychology at University of California, Santa Cruz). 
195.  Steinbuch, supra note 164, at 510 (quoting Craig Haney, Mental Health Issues in 
Long-Term Solitary and “Supermax” Confinement, 49 CRIME & DELINQ. CONFINEMENT 124, 
132 (2003)). 
196.  Grassian, supra note 193, at 1451. 
197.  Id. at 1452. 
198.  Id. at 1453. 
199.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 68, at 38. 
200.  Id. at 38–39. 
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noting that when studying the Massachusetts inmates, Dr. Grassian 
stated all the inmates he met denied any negative psychological issues 
and only began to describe their mental anguish upon particularized and 
prying questions.201  The GAO also noted in its report that the studies it 
relied on overwhelmingly supported the proposition that long-term 
solitary confinement causes negative psychological effects.202 
The studies that have been conducted on the effects of long-term 
solitary confinement resoundingly point to a single truth: Solitary 
confinement likely causes negative psychological effects on inmates.  
And while the BOP claims there are no negative impacts from long-
term disciplinary confinement,203 the BOP’s Psychology Services Manual 
“recognizes that extended periods of confinement in Administrative 
Detention or Disciplinary Segregation Status may have an adverse 
effect on the overall mental status of some individuals.”204  At 
sentencing, a convict’s physical liberty is lost, but—other than the goal 
to encourage better morals and good character—never is the loss of his 
mental liberty contemplated.  There is no question this is a significant 
hardship. 
C. The Federal Government Has Recognized How Problematic Solitary 
Confinement Is for Inmates 
Recently, there has been movement in both the Legislative and 
Executive Branches to investigate and correct the problems of solitary 
confinement.  Senator Richard Durbin of Illinois has held two 
congressional hearings—in 2012 and 2014—investigating the current use 
of solitary confinement;205 during both hearings, Senator Durbin stated 
that solitary confinement is overused in America.206  In response to the 
 
201.  Grassian, supra note 193, at 1451–52. 
202.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 68, at 39. 
203.  Id. at 39–40. 
204.  Id. at 40 (quoting FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NO. 5310.12, 
PSYCHOLOGY SERVICES MANUAL § 4.2 (1995)). 
205.  Reassessing Solitary Confinement, supra note 191; Reassessing Solitary Confinement 
II: The Human Rights, Fiscal, and Public Safety Consequences, 113th Cong (2014) [hereinafter 
Reassessing Solitary Confinement II], http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/reassessing-
solitary-confinement-ii-the-human-rights-fiscal-and-public-safety-consequences [perma.cc/M
K6M-JGWD]. 
206.  Reassessing Solitary Confinement, supra note 191; Reassessing Solitary Confinement 
II, supra 205; see also ACLU, BRIEFING PAPER: THE DANGEROUS OVERUSE OF SOLITARY 
CONFINEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 14 (2014), 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/stop_solitary_briefing_paper_updated_august_2
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same problem, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has 
implemented new monitoring requirements and a new policy on the use 
of solitary confinement.207  Both of these—along with the recent GAO 
report208—evidence government-recognized problems of current policies 
underlying the use of solitary confinement. 
At Senator Durbin’s first congressional hearing, he noted that the 
United States employs solitary confinement more than any other 
democratic nation and said, “The dramatic expansion of the use of 
solitary confinement is a human rights issue we can’t ignore.”209  He 
called attention to the current policy’s impact on inmates’ mental health 
and the impact that has on the nation’s safety.210  Dr. Craig Haney, a 
psychology professor, testified before Congress that solitary 
confinement “can lead to mental illness, self-mutilation and a 
‘disturbingly high’ rate of suicide.”211  Congress also heard testimony 
evidencing the use of solitary confinement increases violence among 
prisoners and the fiscal irresponsibility underlying the use of solitary 
confinement.212  At the end of the first hearing, Senator Durbin said, 
“All of these issues lead to the obvious conclusion: we need to reassess 
solitary confinement and honestly reform policies which do not make us 
safer.”213 
ICE has recently revised its policies regarding the use of disciplinary 
segregation.214  Aimed at correcting the abuses that pervade solitary 
confinement practices, ICE requires that any detainee placed in solitary 
 
014.pdf [perma.cc/5KNY-ZUZB]. 
207.  U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, NO. 11065.1, REVIEW OF THE USE OF 
SEGREGATION FOR ICE DETAINEES (2013), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-
reform/pdf/segregation_directive.pdf [perma.cc/ZUC4-LTRQ]; see also ACLU, supra note 
206, at 12. 
208.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 68; see also supra Part III.B 
(providing a detailed discussion of the GAO report). 
209.  Press Release, Dick Durbin, supra note 167 (noting that nationwide, roughly 
80,000 of the more than 2.3 million inmates are held in “some kind of restricted detention,” 
which is approximately 3.5% of the prison population). 
210.  Id. 
211.  Id. 
212.  Id. 
213.  Id. 
214.  See U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, supra note 207.  “Because ICE is 
comparable to BOP in many ways, including its extensive national network of government-
run and private contract facilities, the ICE directive sets a strong example of rigorous 
monitoring and substantive requirements which BOP can and should follow.”  ACLU, supra 
note 206, at 12. 
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confinement should be reviewed within seven days and every week 
thereafter.215  During these reviews, the supervisor interviews the 
detainee to ensure he has “received all services to which he . . . is 
entitled.”216  During the weekly review, the supervisor should always 
consider alternative housing options and is assisted by ICE headquarters 
in making any alternative placement.217  Where solitary confinement is 
appropriate, the supervisor is encouraged to limit the amount of solitary 
by adding to the detainees’ out-of-cell time and arranging for the 
detainees participation in group activities.218  All reports require “clear 
articulation” of whether the reason for placement in solitary 
confinement was valid and whether that reason remains valid.219  If there 
are cases of particular note or concern, they will be regularly reviewed 
by the Detention Monitoring Council at ICE headquarters, which is 
comprised of a variety of ICE management.220  The goal of ICE’s new 
policy is clear: minimize the use of solitary confinement. 
Both the congressional hearings on solitary confinement in the 
United States and ICE’s new policy support the inferences that there 
are serious issues with the current use of solitary confinement in the 
United States and that there is a growing public concern over its use.  
This is further supported by the roughly 90% drop in solitary 
confinement population in Mississippi and Colorado and 50% drop in 
Washington’s solitary confinement population.221 
VII.OVERTURNING PRECEDENT 
The following part describes what conditions must be present to 
overturn Supreme Court precedent, whether by the Supreme Court 
itself or by the courts generally restricted by Supreme Court precedent.  
Those reasons include recent cases’ inconsistency with prior Supreme 
Court precedent and a change in social values.  Developing those 
reasons in the context of Sandin v. Conner,222 it is apparent the 
holding—though not the logic—in that case should no longer have 
precedential value. 
 
215.  U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, supra note 207, at 4–5. 
216.  Id. at 5. 
217.  Id. 
218.  Id. 
219.  Id. at 8. 
220.  Id. at 10–11. 
221.  See Steinbuch, supra note 164, at 502. 
222.  515 U.S. 472 (1995). 
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A. Overturning Supreme Court Precedent 
One of the fundamental rules in American law is “stare decisis,” 
which is to say when a higher court issues a holding that should be 
followed by all courts below.223  However, while there has long been the 
belief that this rule outweighed the actual determination of a holdings’ 
rightness,224 there has also been the belief that prior holdings could be 
mistakenly made and should be overturned.225  Thus, a variety of 
reasons have developed to overturn Supreme Court precedent.226  The 
holding at issue in Sandin implicates two strong reasons for overturning 
precedent: inconsistency with other Supreme Court decisions and 
changed societal conditions.227 
The first reason to overturn a Supreme Court precedent is its 
inconsistency with other Supreme Court holdings.228  A strong example 
of this is the case of Hobbs v. Thompson.229  That case dealt with the 
political speech rights of public employees.230  In that case, the Fifth 
Circuit held the decision in United Public Workers of America v. 
Mitchell231 ran afoul of First Amendment cases decided “as early as 
1940.”232  Those cases demanded any law effecting First Amendment 
rights must be narrowly drawn, contrary to the holding in Mitchell; the 
Fifth Circuit found those cases accurately captured the protections owed 
to First Amendment rights and found Mitchell was no longer good 
law.233  This demonstrates the importance of consistency within the law, 
which may rely on a history of developed case law rather than a singular 
decision. 
 
223.  Margaret N. Kniffin, Overruling Supreme Court Precedents: Anticipatory Action by 
United States Courts of Appeals, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 53, 54 (1982). 
224.  Id. at 55 (“Justice Brandeis wrote: ‘Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because 
in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be 
settled right.’” (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
225.  Id. (“Justice Cardozo observed that ‘the whole subject matter of jurisprudence is 
more plastic, more malleable, the [moulds] less definitively cast, the bounds of right and 
wrong less preordained and constant, than most of us . . . have been accustomed to believe.’” 
(quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 161 (1921)). 
226.  See id. at 61–71. 
227.  Id. at 68–70. 
228.  Id. at 68. 
229.  448 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1971). 
230.  Id. at 457. 
231.  330 U.S. 75 (1947). 
232.  Hobbs, 448 F.2d at 471–72. 
233.  Id. at 472–73. 
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The second reason to overturn a Supreme Court precedent is 
changed societal conditions.234  In 1943, the Supreme Court held that a 
school regulation compelling students to salute the flag was 
unconstitutional.235  When discussing a shift in American attitudes 
concerning the role of government in citizens’ affairs, Justice Jackson 
wrote: 
These changed conditions often deprive precedents of reliability 
and cast us more than we would choose upon our own judgment.  
But we act in these matters not by authority of our competence 
but by force of our commissions.  We cannot, because of modest 
estimates of our competence in such specialties as public 
education, withhold the judgment that history authenticates as 
the function of this Court when liberty is infringed.236 
This is a strong statement on the value of the national zeitgeist in law.  
What this case suggests, and Professor Kniffin asserts, is that noticeable 
and pervasive social trends have the potential to influence Supreme 
Court decisions, even in the face of contrary precedent.237 
B. Overturning Sandin v. Conner 
When an individual is facing imprisonment at the fault of bad 
precedent, that court has a strong interest in resolving that case against 
precedent—loss of liberty is a powerful interest justifying a challenge to 
precedent.238  While Sandin holds that inmates in disciplinary 
confinement do not have a liberty interest warranting strong due process 
protections, in light of current understandings of the mental dangers 
disciplinary segregation poses and the growing societal concern for 
inmate populations, the analytical framework provided in Wolff v. 
McDonnell239 and Sandin v. Conner240 suggests inmates facing 
disciplinary segregation do have a protectable liberty interest.  
 
234.  Kniffin, supra note 223, at 70–71.  Oliver Wendell Holmes accurately captured this 
sentiment when he said, “We do not realize how large a part of our law is open to 
reconsideration upon a slight change in the habit of the public mind.”  Id. at 70 n.90 (quoting 
O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 466 (1897)). 
235.  W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
236.  Id. at 640 (emphasis added). 
237.  See id.; Kniffin, supra note 223, at 70–71. 
238.  See Kniffin, supra note 223, at 77 (citing Rowe v. Peyton, 383 F. 2d 709 (4th Cir. 
1967), aff’d, 391 U.S. 54 (1968) (describing how, under Supreme Court precedent, an inmate 
would have faced years of imprisonment before he could challenge his conviction)). 
239.  418 U.S. 539 (1974). 
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Wolff made clear that inmates, while not enjoying the full panoply of 
rights, do have liberty interests that may invoke Fifth Amendment due 
process protections.241  Sandin stated that inmates facing solitary 
confinement do not possess strong due process protections because they 
are not facing an “atypical and significant hardship” differing from 
ordinary prison life;242 however, as established in Part VI, disciplinary 
segregation is both atypical and significant.  The vast majority of the 
prison population does not experience disciplinary segregation in the 
BOP, particularly when discussing ADX, so it is in fact significant.243  
Further, it is a significant hardship because the inmates in disciplinary 
segregation face negative psychological effects—and not to a minor 
degree.244  There is little doubt these inmates face an atypical and 
significant hardship invoking due process protections under the Fifth 
Amendment. 
Relevant to the analysis is that disciplinary confinement may work 
contrary to effective prison administration and achievement of 
penological interests.  Disciplinary segregation is incredibly expensive 
compared with general population prisons, medium security prisons, and 
high security prisons.245  There is also a complete lack of evidence 
demonstrating disciplinary segregation reduces violence and assaults in 
prisons.246  The former alone is not a reason to question a prison policy 
or program, but when compounded with the latter proposition, there 
seems to be little reason to defer to prison administration.  The value of 
disciplinary confinement in the BOP is thrown further into question 
when noting that inmates who spent significant time in disciplinary 
segregation have higher rates of recidivism.247  It is also important to 
note the government’s seemingly widespread recognition of the dangers 
disciplinary confinement poses, as well as the growing public outcry over 
its use—evidenced by a number of campaigns fighting the use of solitary 
confinement.248 
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In light of all that, it cannot be maintained that the current BOP 
procedure for placement in disciplinary confinement meets the required 
procedural safeguards.249  The recognition that disciplinary confinement 
is an “atypical and significant hardship” brings Sandin and Wilkinson in 
line with prior due process cases that focused on the nature of the 
deprivation—Morrissey and Wolff.  Due process protections are flexible, 
and here they are strong in the face of grievous loss. 
VIII.WHAT DUE PROCESS IS REQUIRED WHEN DETERMINING 
WHETHER DISCIPLINARY CONFINEMENT IS APPROPRIATE 
The issues surrounding current disciplinary confinement policies—
ADX in the BOP—do not call for an entirely new system, nor are they 
designed to burden the prison administration.  Morrissey v. Brewer set 
out basic and flexible standards for meeting due process requirements 
that adequately address the imposition of disciplinary segregation,250 as 
it is an “atypical and significant hardship” deserving procedural 
safeguards.251  Due process in this case requires at least two additions to 
the current process: the right to confront one’s accuser and the right to 
call witnesses in one’s defense. 
There is little value in hiding the accuser from the accused inmate.  It 
is either a prison staff member, who need not fear the inmate’s 
retaliation, or it is another inmate, who is already known as the victim of 
the accused’s conduct.  At the very least, it is important any of the 
reviewing authorities meet with the accuser in camera, prepared with 
questions from the accused, so that the authorities may determine for 
themselves the reliability of the accuser—reliance on a written 
statement is merely that and nothing more: reliance. 
The right to call witnesses poses the same problem, which is easily 
resolved by meeting in camera with questions provided by the accused.  
The secondary issue with calling witnesses is the problems it may cause 
with prison administration, particularly when the witness is a staff 
member with other responsibilities to take care of.  However, as 
discussed above, there are potentially serious consequences to placing 
someone in solitary confinement, concerns warranting due process, so 
 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights-prisoners-rights/new-limits-announced-ices-solita
ry-confinement-immigrants [perma.cc/UCC4-WQZQ]; see also supra Part VI.C. 
249.  But see Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 230 (2005). 
250.  See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972). 
251.  See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995). 
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efficient prison administration should not overcome the constitutional 
commands of the Fifth Amendment. 
It is essential that all inmates facing placement in ADX disciplinary 
segregation be granted their due process rights.  They are facing the loss 
of a liberty not contemplated in their initial sentence and newly created 
by the BOP’s own policies and are thus granted protections under the 
Fifth Amendment—not the least of which are the rights to face one’s 
accuser and call witnesses in one’s defense.  Under the reasoning 
provided by Sandin v. Conner,252 and in light of modern psychology, 
imposition of solitary confinement on any inmate requires added 
procedural safeguards. 
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